Added: Dennise Bare - Date: 05.10.2021 08:12 - Views: 18884 - Clicks: 8641
Discover our mission: IC principles, history, and success stories. Snowden disclosed that the agency was gathering phone records of millions of Americans. Inglis retires Friday. Before stepping down, he talked to Morning Edition co-host Steve Inskeep about running a spy agency in a democracy. Below is a transcript of the unedited audio of their conversation. We walked, this week, into a vast building covered in reflective glass, the headquarters of the National Security Agency. We met there with John C. Inglis was in his final week at the NSA. The accusations of misbehavior, which have not been borne out.
Most deputy directors at NSA, on average, serve about three and a half years. And so by rights, I would have left three years ago. But we stayed, Gen. Alexander and I both stayed for a combination of reasons year by year. In the beginning of this year, we knew that we were going to head into some financial difficulties. The nation is trying to figure its way through sequestration.
There were some furloughs that were on the table for the Department of Defense. Such that those who are keenly paying attention to that might then avoid our interest. And so we can say with great confidence that terrorists and rogue nations have been paying attention and have begun to take the necessary steps to invalidate the means and methods by which we would get intelligence on them.
But it also has harmed relationships between the executive branch and other components of the government. The American public is certainly in a state of shock and dismay about what have been alleged abuses by NSA. The presidential review group recently concluded that there have been no illegalities or abuses by NSA. There are matters of policy before us, in terms of how you employ modern intelligence capabilities like we have at NSA.
We have to actually kind of be more transparent going forward, so the American public understands what we do, why we do it, how we do it. And then, two, there have been some difficulties between ourselves and this nation and other nations with whom were aligned, with whom we have common interests.
And then, finally, the private sector, which essentially is the engine of commerce driving the Internet forward. Because when I think about the way that people have been known to respond to revelations like this, they actually end up having to deny themselves the use of the entire global telecommunications network. I think of Osama bin Laden, who ends up hiding in a house and can only work with messengers.
Does it really damage them that much to know that someone is out there attempting to monitor them?
They must know that we would have an interest in their activities, and that they communicate about those activities. We must then, you know, use that as an opportunity to better understand them. It might be surprising to someone that a communication that makes its way from, say, some ungoverned space in the north of southwest Asia to a place like Yemen sometimes transits through the United States of America.
It might be then be Discreet nsa right now for review by a foreign intelligence organization like the National Security Agency. We have reminded people of that time and time again across the summer. And within the Internet there are enormous of choices that you might avail yourself of.
And then there are security services that you can overlay with that. Something that we were able to do might be lost because it was simply a technology transformation. And they naturally move to something else, or something that we had as a capability has slipped away from us based upon the natural roil that is technology and operational practice. INSKEEP: So you feel there was ificant damage that you can measure from the various disclosures of programs like the metadata gathering program, of the monitoring of foreign leaders.
Given the damage that has been done by the revelation of programs the NSA did in fact conduct, were those programs worth it? INGLIS: Nations like the United States, I think all nations, essentially conduct their affairs in the larger world have to know something about the threats to their people in the territory. They would like to know something about the success or not of their foreign policies. And therefore, it continues to be worth it to invest in foreign intelligence.
Was the metadata program, for example, has it been worth it, given that part of the cost of it is that it got disclosed eventually? But we were able to disclose in an unclassified domain, there are about 54 plots. Thirteen of those essentially had a U.
Most nations have that. So most of those are attributable to that. Can you say that was the silver bullet, right, that but-for the existence of the metadata you would not have uncovered a plot? I think we were able to essentially tell the FBI that an individual was materially involved in terrorism that they had, three years prior, investigated based on a tip and kind of laid that case to rest. And but for the Program, which we essentially tied that individual to some foreign terrorist activity overseas, the FBI would have let that case lain fallow for quite sometime.
That we could see the other end of that communication Discreet nsa right now a safe house overseas but did not know and did not have the means by which to say that the further end of that was actually in the United States of America. So the metadata program was deed to cover that seam. And very narrowly constrained to only that case.
You initially said, the agency said, and your boss General Alexander said, 54 plots were disrupted. They said it was hard to find any cases. If the reward from this program has been worth the financial cost, the cost in manpower, the cost in time and the political damage of it ultimately being disclosed, as many things ultimately are disclosed.
I think we as a nation have to ask ourselves the policy question of what risks do we want to cover?
Do we want to cover percent of the risk? Or do we want to perhaps take a risk that from time to time something will get through? And about 3, people lost their lives that day. There are other implementations of the program. You could compel others to essentially do the kind of search that today NSA is authorized and charged to undertake. I have an insurance policy on my house.
Are you now as an agency considering those other ways? Just leaving the information with the phone company, for example, and picking it up through a, through a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court when you need it? We would be a component of executing that choice. What would we offer, having some subject matter expertise in this is that two things. One, you have to first determine for what purpose would you want to have this program? So against the 54 plots that were disrupted, since 41 of those had no U.
It could have only made a contribution to the remaining We essentially used this for 12 of the remaining It returned information in 8 of those that we turned over to the FBI. They could focus their time and attention elsewhere. But you have to first determine, do you have a purpose like that for which you would collect this data? Then you have to determine what are the criteria of any implementation, regardless of where the data is stored, or who stores it, or who searches it.
I think those criterion are four in. You have to ensure that there are controls imposed on that data. I think that was the great disservice that was initially done in the unauthorized disclosures, which is that what was released in the public domain was the order that said, NSA is authorized to collect the information, period. But it was the secondary order. Telecommunications companies today who collect this metadata for business purposes do so with varying lengths of time. And they do so in varying formats.
Some of them might have it for 6 months, some of them might have it for years. The third criterion would be does it have sufficient breadth. And then the fourth and final criteria is that the program would have to have sufficient agility.
If you can meet those four criterion, I think that you can implement this in any of ways. And we are wide open to that. NSA does not determine the policy in this regard.Discreet nsa right now
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Outgoing NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Interviewed on National Public Radio